Argumentation ethics

Argumentation ethics is a libertarian political theory developed in 1988 by Hans-Hermann Hoppe, a Professor Emeritus with the University of Nevada, Las Vegas College of Business and Ludwig von Mises Institute Senior Fellow.[1] Argumentation ethics aims to prove that arguing for any ethical position other than libertarian anarchism and the non-aggression principle is logically incoherent. Responses have mainly come from Hoppe's colleagues at the Mises Institute, among whom the argument's reception has been mixed.[2]

Hoppe states that because both parties in a debate propound propositions in the course of argumentation, and because argumentation presupposes various norms including non-violence, the act of propounding a proposition that negates the presupposed norms of argumentation is a logical contradiction between one's actions and one's words (a performative contradiction). Specifically, to argue that violence should be used to resolve conflicts (instead of argumentation) is a performative contradiction.[3] Thus, Hoppe argues that arguing against libertarian anarchism and the non-aggression principle is logically incoherent.

Foundation

Hoppe states that his theory is an a priori, value-free praxeological argument for deontological libertarian ethics.[1] Argumentation ethics asserts the non-aggression principle is a presupposition of every argument and so cannot be logically denied during an argument. Argumentation ethics draws on ideas from Jürgen Habermas's and Karl-Otto Apel's discourse ethics, from Misesian praxeology and from the political philosophy of Murray Rothbard.

Hoppe first notes that when two parties are in conflict with one another, they can choose to resolve the conflict by engaging in violence, or engaging in argumentation. In the event that they choose to engage in argumentation, Hoppe asserts that the parties have implicitly rejected violence as a way to resolve their conflict. He therefore concludes that non-violence is an underlying norm (Grundnorm) of argumentation that is accepted by both parties.

Hoppe states that because both parties propound propositions in the course of argumentation, and because argumentation must presuppose certain norms, including non-violence, the act of propounding a proposition that negates the presupposed propositions of argumentation is a logical contradiction between one's actions and one's words (this is called a performative contradiction). Specifically, to argue that violence should be used to resolve conflicts (instead of argumentation) is a performative contradiction.[3]

Non-aggression principle

Argumentation ethics aims to show the non-aggression principle follows from the non-violence presupposition of argumentation, and so it cannot be denied.

If violence is not a norm that can be logically justified in argumentation as a way to resolve a conflict, Hoppe asks which norms can indeed be justified in argumentation. Hoppe first argues that only universal norms are consistent with argumentation, as arbitrary categorical distinctions have no intersubjective justification, which is a presupposition of argumentation. Hoppe then argues that since argumentation requires the active use of one's body, all universal norms for resolving conflicts over the human body aside from self-ownership are inconsistent with argumentation.[4] Hoppe then argues that since the resolution of conflicts over external resources must also be objectively justifiable, only the physical establishment of an objective link by original appropriation (i.e., homesteading) is a norm compatible with such a requirement. From these Hoppe concludes that only the non-aggression principle of self-ownership and Lockean homesteading can be justified in an argument without contradiction.[5]

Punishment and self-defense

Bearing reference to the legal doctrine of estoppel, Stephan Kinsella's "Dialogical Estoppel" theory extends argumentation ethics by considering an argument between a victim and aggressor. Kinsella argues that an aggressor cannot consistently object to being proportionally punished for his act of aggression, by the victim or by the victim's representatives, because by committing aggression he commits himself to the proposition that the use of force is legitimate, and therefore, his withholding consent based on a normative right not to be physically harmed contradicts his aggressive legitimation of force, i.e. he is "estopped" from withholding consent.[6]

Responses from colleagues

Various responses to Hoppe's argument came from Mises Institute scholars.[2] Some of them accepted his argument, among them attorney Kinsella[7] and economists Walter Block and Murray Rothbard,[8] who called it "a dazzling breakthrough for political philosophy in general and for libertarianism in particular," adding "he has managed to transcend the famous is/ought, fact/value dichotomy that has plagued philosophy since the days of the Scholastics..."[8]

Mises Institute economists Bob Murphy and Gene Callahan rejected Hoppe's argument.[9] The late Austrian Economist David Osterfeld, an adjunct scholar at the Mises Institute, also rejected Hoppe's argument in an essay to which Hoppe subsequently responded.[10] Walter Block has since defended the argument[11] and Marian Eabrasu rebuts a wide range of criticisms.[12]

Ludwig Von Mises Institute Senior Fellow and Auburn University philosopher Roderick Long reconstructed the argument in deductively valid form, specifying four premises on whose truth the argument's soundness depends. Long goes on to argue that each premise is either uncertain, doubtful, or clearly false. He summarizes his views by stating:

I don’t think there’s any reason to reject out of hand the kind of argument that Hoppe tries to give; on the contrary, the idea that there might be some deep connection between libertarian rights and the requirements of rational discourse is one I find attractive and eminently plausible. [...] But I am not convinced that the specific argument Hoppe gives us is successful.[13]

A political theorist has concluded in a doctoral dissertation on the political philosophy of several Austrian economists that Hoppe has not provided any non-circular reasons why we "have to regard moral values as something that must be regarded as being established through (consensual) argument instead of 'mere' subjective preferences for situations turning out in certain ways". In other words, the theory relies on "on the existence [of] certain intuitions, the acceptance of which cannot itself be the result of 'value-free' reasoning."[14]

See also

References

  1. 1 2 Hoppe, Hans-Hermann; Murray N. Rothbard; David Friedman; Leland Yeager; David Gordon; Douglas Rasmussen (November 1988). "Liberty Symposium" (PDF). Liberty. 2.
  2. 1 2 Kinsella, Stephan (March 13, 2009). "Revisiting Argumentation Ethics". Mises Economics Blog. Ludwig von Mises Institute. [A] number of thinkers weighed in, including Rothbard, ... Conway, ... D. Friedman, ... Machan, ... Lomasky, ... Yeager, ...Rasmussen, and others....
  3. 1 2 Hoppe, Hans-Hermann (September 1988). "The Ultimate Justification of Private Property" (PDF). Liberty. 1: 20.
  4. ↑ Hoppe, Hans-Hermann (20 May 2002). "Rothbardian Ethics". LewRockwell.com. Retrieved 6 February 2012.
  5. ↑ The Ultimate Justification of the Private Property Ethic. Hans Hoppe
  6. ↑ Punishment and Proportionality: The Estoppel Approach. N.S. Kinsella
  7. ↑ Kinsella, Stephan (19 September 2002). "Defending Argumentation Ethics: Reply to Murphy & Callahan". Anti-State.com. Retrieved 9 February 2012.
  8. 1 2 Rothbard, Murray N. (November 1988). "Beyond Is and Ought". Mises.org. Retrieved 14 October 2012.
  9. ↑ Murphy, Robert P.; Callahan, Gene (Spring 2006). "Hans-Hermann Hoppe's Argumentation Ethics: A Critique" (PDF). Journal of Libertarian Studies. 20 (2): 53–6. Retrieved 9 February 2012.
  10. ↑ "Comment on Hoppe / Comment on Osterfeld" (PDF). Austrian Economics Newsletter. 1988. Retrieved 14 October 2012.
  11. ↑ https://mises.org/system/tdf/22_1_31.pdf?file=1&type=document
  12. ↑ http://libertarianpapers.org/wp-content/uploads/article/2009/lp-1-20.pdf
  13. ↑ Long, Roderick T. "The Hopperiori Argument".
  14. ↑ J. Mikael Olsson, Austrian Economics as Political Philosophy, Stockholm Studies in Politics 161, p. 157, 161.

Further reading

External links

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